Coordination after gains and losses: is prospect theory's value function predictive for games?
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Coordination after gains and losses: is prospect theory's value function predictive for games?
zbMATH Open document ID: 1232.91110
author: D. Kharzeev
published in: Journal of Mathematical Psychology
publication date: 2010-10-14T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/59524
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A35
zbMATH DE Number: 5800083
zbMATH Keywords: prospect game theory
zbMATH Keywords: prior outcomes
zbMATH Keywords: coordination
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium selection
zbMATH Keywords: economic experiment
describes a project that uses: Z-Tree
describes a project that uses: AS 159
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2134890343
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JMP.2010.05.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5800083