Reserve prices in a dynamic auction when bidders are capacity-constrained
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Reserve prices in a dynamic auction when bidders are capacity-constrained
zbMATH Open document ID: 1196.91032
author: Viplav Saini
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2010-10-15T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5800770
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic auction
zbMATH Keywords: capacity constraint
zbMATH Keywords: reserve price
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2010.05.024
OpenAlex ID: W2065241295
cites work: Sequential bidding in auctions of construction contracts
cites work: Sequential versus bundle auctions for recurring procurement
cites work: Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game
cites work: Asymmetric Auctions
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.05.024
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5800770