Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1250.91044
author: Hans Gersbach
author: Maik T. Schneider
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2012-10-16T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: Gersbach Schneider MSS12 Tax contracts Government Formation.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B15
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B64
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6094302
zbMATH Keywords: tax contracts
zbMATH Keywords: government formation
zbMATH Keywords: welfare of voters
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1965822118
cites work: The optimal degree of commitment in a negotiation with a deadline
cites work: Do voters vote ideologically?
cites work: Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
cites work: Electoral Systems and Public Spending
cites work: A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
cites work: Q5697040
DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2012.04.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6094302