Computing optimal contracts in combinatorial agencies
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Computing optimal contracts in combinatorial agencies
zbMATH Open document ID: 1259.91033
author: Yuval Emek
author: Michal Feldman
published in: Theoretical Computer Science
publication date: 2012-10-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68Q17
zbMATH DE Number: 6093013
zbMATH Keywords: game theory
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: hidden action
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.tcs.2012.05.018
OpenAlex ID: W2017843071
cites work: Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency
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DOI: 10.1016/J.TCS.2012.05.018
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6093013