Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
zbMATH Open document ID: 1236.91073
author: Omer Biran
author: Françoise Forges
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2011-10-12T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/4100
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 5957611
zbMATH Keywords: auctions
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian game
zbMATH Keywords: collusion
zbMATH Keywords: core
zbMATH Keywords: partition function game
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3125840495
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2011.01.009
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5957611