Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules
zbMATH Open document ID: 1236.91075
author: Daniel Cardona
author: Clara Ponsatí
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2011-10-12T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 5957612
zbMATH Keywords: one-dimensional bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: single-peaked preferences
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto optimality
zbMATH Keywords: quota rules
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2011.01.006
OpenAlex ID: W2027421555
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2011.01.006
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5957612