Verifiable disclosure
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Verifiable disclosure
zbMATH Open document ID: 1403.91230
author: Jeremy Bertomeu
author: Davide Cianciaruso
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2018-07-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 6911253
zbMATH Keywords: disclosure
zbMATH Keywords: unraveling
zbMATH Keywords: verification
zbMATH Keywords: truthful
zbMATH Keywords: uncertain information endowment
zbMATH Keywords: sanitation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-017-1048-x
OpenAlex ID: W3193212962
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-017-1048-X
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6911253