Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects
zbMATH Open document ID: 1403.91211
author: Kazuhiko Hashimoto
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2018-07-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
zbMATH DE Number: 6911254
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto-efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: identical preferences lower bound
zbMATH Keywords: top trading cycle rule
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-017-1049-9
OpenAlex ID: W2609537768
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-017-1049-9
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6911254