Payoff shares in two-player contests
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Payoff shares in two-player contests
zbMATH Open document ID: 1406.91178
author: Samuel Häfner
author: Georg Nöldeke
published in: Games
publication date: 2018-08-01T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, players' shares sum to less than one because a residual share of the value is lost due to rent dissipation. In this paper, we consider contests with two players and investigate the relationship between these equilibrium shares and the parameters of a class of asymmetric Tullock contest success functions. Our main finding is that any players' shares that sum up to less than one can arise as the unique outcome of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for appropriate parameters.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 6911958
zbMATH Keywords: contests
zbMATH Keywords: pure-strategy equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: rent-dissipation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g7030025
OpenAlex ID: W2159290335
cites work: Q5323812
cites work: Contest success functions: an extension
cites work: Q4255117
cites work: On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games
cites work: Asymmetric contests with general technologies
cites work: Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games
cites work: Contest success functions
DOI: 10.3390/G7030025
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6911958