Discrimination in contests: a survey
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Discrimination in contests: a survey
zbMATH Open document ID: 1349.91123
author: Yosef Mealem
author: Shmuel Nitzan
published in: Review of Economic Design
publication date: 2016-07-12T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 6603078
zbMATH Keywords: contest design
zbMATH Keywords: revenue maximization
zbMATH Keywords: direct
zbMATH Keywords: overt
zbMATH Keywords: covert and head starts-discrimination
zbMATH Keywords: contest success function
zbMATH Keywords: lottery
zbMATH Keywords: all-pay-auction
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10058-016-0186-0
OpenAlex ID: W2333673179
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DOI: 10.1007/S10058-016-0186-0
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6603078