A core of voting games with improved foresight
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A core of voting games with improved foresight
zbMATH Open document ID: 1193.91046
author: Lawrence Diffo Lambo
author: Bertrand Tchantcho
author: Joël Moulen
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2009-10-15T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 5615456
zbMATH Keywords: voting games
zbMATH Keywords: core
zbMATH Keywords: stability set
zbMATH Keywords: foresighted core
zbMATH Keywords: P-core
zbMATH Keywords: no-regret property
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.mathsocsci.2009.04.003
OpenAlex ID: W2064909507
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DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2009.04.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5615456