Social choice theory without Pareto: the pivotal voter approach
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Social choice theory without Pareto: the pivotal voter approach
zbMATH Open document ID: 1193.91050
author: Michael K. Miller
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2009-10-15T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 5615459
zbMATH Keywords: social choice theory
zbMATH Keywords: preference aggregation theory
zbMATH Keywords: Wilson's theorem
zbMATH Keywords: Arrow's theorem
zbMATH Keywords: pivotal voters
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.mathsocsci.2009.02.003
OpenAlex ID: W2075253156
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DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2009.02.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5615459