Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1184.91042
author: Michael Finus
author: Bianca Rundshagen
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2009-10-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 5617747
zbMATH Keywords: two-stage game
zbMATH Keywords: coalition formation
zbMATH Keywords: exclusive membership game
zbMATH Keywords: strong Nash equilibrium
Wikidata QID: Q57921094
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-008-0330-z
OpenAlex ID: W1995808360
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-008-0330-Z
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5617747