Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?
zbMATH Open document ID: 1183.91043
author: Sayantan Ghosal
author: Ben Lockwood
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2009-10-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
zbMATH DE Number: 5617930
zbMATH Keywords: private preference
zbMATH Keywords: heterogeneous information
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto-ranking
zbMATH Keywords: compulsory voting
zbMATH Keywords: voluntary voting
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-008-0344-6
OpenAlex ID: W1976944491
cites work: A Bayesian model of voting in juries
cites work: Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
cites work: Information acquisition in committees
cites work: Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
cites work: Would rational voters acquire costly information?
cites work: Committee Design with Endogenous Information
cites work: Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
DOI: 10.1007/S00355-008-0344-6
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5617930