Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets
zbMATH Open document ID: 1183.91111
author: Elette Boyle
author: Federico Echenique
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2009-10-19T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79571/
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 5617933
zbMATH Keywords: sequential bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: NTU Shapley value
zbMATH Keywords: coalitional monotonicity
Wikidata QID: Q59900136
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2122660630
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-008-0347-3
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5617933