Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
zbMATH Open document ID: 1183.91051
author: Masashi Umezawa
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2009-10-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B10
zbMATH DE Number: 5617936
zbMATH Keywords: coalitional strategy-proofness (CSP)
zbMATH Keywords: preference profile
zbMATH Keywords: max-min criterion
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto rule
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-008-0351-7
OpenAlex ID: W2046003173
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-008-0351-7
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5617936