Estimating first-price auctions with an unknown number of bidders: a misclassification approach
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Estimating first-price auctions with an unknown number of bidders: a misclassification approach
zbMATH Open document ID: 1431.91159
author: Yonghong An
author: Yingyao Hu
author: Matthew Shum
published in: Journal of Econometrics
publication date: 2016-08-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 62G05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 62P20
zbMATH DE Number: 6609154
zbMATH Keywords: auction models
zbMATH Keywords: nonparametric identification
zbMATH Keywords: misclassification
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jeconom.2010.02.002
OpenAlex ID: W2116418536
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JECONOM.2010.02.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6609154