Private-information group contests: best-shot competition
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Private-information group contests: best-shot competition
zbMATH Open document ID: 1394.91153
author: Stefano Barbieri
author: David A. Malueg
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2016-08-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6617250
zbMATH Keywords: group contest
zbMATH Keywords: private information
zbMATH Keywords: all-pay auction
zbMATH Keywords: best shot
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2016.06.015
OpenAlex ID: W2463846540
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2016.06.015
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6617250