Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1322.91019
author: Fabio Dercole
author: Marco De Carli
author: F. Della Rossa
author: Alessandro Vittorio Papadopoulos
published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology
publication date: 2015-10-13T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
zbMATH DE Number: 6493498
zbMATH Keywords: altruistic punishment
zbMATH Keywords: finite populations
zbMATH Keywords: fixation of cooperation
zbMATH Keywords: public goods games
zbMATH Keywords: replicator dynamics
describes a project that uses: MATCONT
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jtbi.2012.11.034
OpenAlex ID: W2046533010
Wikidata QID: Q42680358
cites work: Q4768040
cites work: Population models with singular equilibrium
cites work: Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
cites work: MATCONT
cites work: Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
cites work: Elements of applied bifurcation theory
cites work: Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
cites work: Q5486447
cites work: Evolving cooperation
cites work: The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
DOI: 10.1016/J.JTBI.2012.11.034
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6493498