Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
zbMATH Open document ID: 0417.90005
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(79)90073-5
author: Milton Harris
author: Artur Raviv
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1979-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
zbMATH DE Number: 3650237
zbMATH Keywords: imperfect information
zbMATH Keywords: allocation of resources
zbMATH Keywords: decision-making of economic agents
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto optimality
zbMATH Keywords: incentive compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: sharing rules
zbMATH Keywords: principal-agent relationship
zbMATH Keywords: unobservable variable
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(79)90073-5
OpenAlex ID: W2041317668
cites work: Q5618987
cites work: Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
cites work: Optimal Risk Sharing and the Leasing of Natural Resources, with Application to Oil and Gas Leasing on the Ocs
cites work: Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
cites work: Q5648116
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650237