A local theory of cooperative games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A local theory of cooperative games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0722.90087
DOI: 10.1007/BF01755480
author: D. Kharzeev
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 1990-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: The complete description of the payoff functions is often impossible if game theoretical models of real situations are constructed. However, it can be possible to determine the gradient of profits following from the transmission from a given strategy vector to some others. A theory of such game models is suggested in the paper. The main results concern the development of strategy choices in such games, and the properties of stable situations represented by specific modifications of the concept of core.
reviewed by: Milan Mareš
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B60
zbMATH DE Number: 4191435
zbMATH Keywords: coalition
zbMATH Keywords: local core
zbMATH Keywords: stable situations
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Q3254691
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4191435