Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives
zbMATH Open document ID: 0553.90012
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(85)90058-4
author: Zvi Ritz
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1985-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: An n-person social choice problem is considered in which the alternatives are \((n+1)\)-dimensional vectors, with the first component of such a vector being that part of the alternative affecting all the individuals together, while the \((i+1)\) component is the part of the alternative affecting individual i alone. Assuming that individuals are selfish, that they may be indifferent among alternatives and that each individual may choose his preferences out of a different set of permissible preferences, we prove that any set of restricted domains of preferences admits an n- person nondictorial Arrow-type social welfare function if and only if it admits an n-person nondictatorial, nonmanipulable and noncorruptible social choice correspondence.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 3882141
zbMATH Keywords: social choice
zbMATH Keywords: restricted domains
zbMATH Keywords: nondictorial Arrow-type social welfare function
zbMATH Keywords: nonmanipulable and noncorruptible social choice correspondence
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(85)90058-4
OpenAlex ID: W4240028409
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3882141