Self-enforcing collusion in large dynamic markets
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Self-enforcing collusion in large dynamic markets
zbMATH Open document ID: 0553.90020
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(84)90145-5
author: Val Eugene Lambson
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1984-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: The ''folk theorem'' in game theory implies that any outcome that is better for all players than some single period Nash outcome can be achieved through noncooperative equilibrium in repeated games with discounting. Whether the folk theorem holds for a repeated Cournot oligopoly as the number of firms, N, increases without bound, is investigated. It is shown that the folk theorem holds in the limit iff demand increases at the same rate as the number of firms and the Cournot price sequence is bounded strictly above by the supremum of marginal cost for large N.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B50
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 3882149
zbMATH Keywords: self-enforcing collusion
zbMATH Keywords: large dynamic markets
zbMATH Keywords: noncooperative equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: repeated games with discounting
zbMATH Keywords: repeated Cournot oligopoly
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(84)90145-5
OpenAlex ID: W1988741369
cites work: Q5563225
cites work: A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
cites work: Q4166473
cites work: Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets
cites work: Cournot Oligopoly and Competitive Behaviour
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3882149