Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes
zbMATH Open document ID: 1274.91168
author: Serguei Kaniovski
author: Alexander Zaigraev
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 2012-03-09T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 6013503
zbMATH Keywords: dichotomous choice
zbMATH Keywords: Condorcet's jury theorem
zbMATH Keywords: correlated votes
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s11238-009-9170-2
OpenAlex ID: W2096781379
Wikidata QID: Q30054738
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DOI: 10.1007/S11238-009-9170-2
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6013503