When too little is as good as nothing at all: rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: When too little is as good as nothing at all: rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds
zbMATH Open document ID: 1279.91104
author: Vikram Manjunath
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2012-03-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
zbMATH DE Number: 6015700
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: fairness
zbMATH Keywords: rationing
zbMATH Keywords: lower-bounds
zbMATH Keywords: sequential priority rules
describes a project that uses: BASS
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2011.08.012
OpenAlex ID: W3125237247
cites work: A simple characterization of the uniform rule
cites work: An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
cites work: Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
cites work: Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
cites work: Constrained allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: an axiomatic analysis
cites work: The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism Versus Laissez-Fairism
cites work: A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
cites work: Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
cites work: Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy
cites work: Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule
cites work: The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
cites work: The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
cites work: Problems of fair division and the egalitarian solution
cites work: A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents
cites work: Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
cites work: Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
cites work: The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
cites work: Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: a survey and open questions
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2011.08.012
Recommended article: Rationing in the presence of baselines
Recommended article: When less is more: rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests
Recommended article: Satiation in Discounted Utility
Recommended article: Q3330918
Recommended article: On the theory of effective demand under stochastic rationing
Recommended article: Too much of a good thing: decision-making in cases with infinitely many utility contributions
Recommended article: Demand uncertainty, incomplete markets, and the optimality of rationing
Recommended article: Choice overload, satisficing behavior, and price distribution in a time allocation model
Recommended article: Q5398622
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6015700