Learning to bid: the design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Learning to bid: the design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1279.91089
author: Thomas H. Noe
author: Jun Wang
author: Michael J. Rebello
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2012-03-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
zbMATH DE Number: 6015703
zbMATH Keywords: auction design
zbMATH Keywords: adaptive learning
zbMATH Keywords: genetic algorithm
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2011.08.005
OpenAlex ID: W2020060422
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2011.08.005
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6015703