The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
zbMATH Open document ID: 1279.91065
author: Patrick W. Schmitz
author: Thomas Tröger
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2012-03-19T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: MPRA paper 32716.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 6015705
zbMATH Keywords: majority rule
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: correlated values
zbMATH Keywords: utilitarianism
Wikidata QID: Q56387584
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2098225016
cites work: Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
cites work: Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
cites work: Robust Mechanism Design
cites work: Efficient compromising
cites work: Storable votes
cites work: Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
cites work: Q5615833
cites work: Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
cites work: Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
cites work: Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
cites work: Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
cites work: Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
cites work: A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
cites work: Voting on Majority Rules
cites work: A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2011.08.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6015705