A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints
zbMATH Open document ID: 1279.91081
author: Isa E. Hafalir
author: R. Ravi
author: Amin Sayedi
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2012-03-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6015708
zbMATH Keywords: Vickrey auctions
zbMATH Keywords: budget constraints
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2011.08.001
OpenAlex ID: W2078470564
cites work: Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets
cites work: Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
cites work: Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
cites work: Q5417648
cites work: Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
cites work: Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
cites work: A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling
cites work: Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
cites work: Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2011.08.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6015708