Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1444.91101
author: Helmuts Āzacis
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2020-07-13T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 7219718
zbMATH Keywords: efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: information disclosure
zbMATH Keywords: seller's revenue
zbMATH Keywords: sequential first-price auctions
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00182-020-00710-8
OpenAlex ID: W2611498503
cites work: An Experimental Study of Information Revelation Policies in Sequential Auctions
cites work: Signal jamming in a sequential auction
cites work: He who must not be named
cites work: Reputational bidding
cites work: Manipulative auction design
cites work: A note on sequential auctions with multi-unit demand
DOI: 10.1007/S00182-020-00710-8
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7219718