Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants
zbMATH Open document ID: 1437.91232
author: Özgün Ekici
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2020-07-13T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
zbMATH DE Number: 7219808
zbMATH Keywords: house allocation with existing tenants
zbMATH Keywords: house allocation
zbMATH Keywords: housing market
zbMATH Keywords: equivalence of mechanisms
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jmateco.2020.05.003
OpenAlex ID: W3026621665
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.05.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7219808