Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Social acceptability of Condorcet committees
zbMATH Open document ID: 1444.91089
author: Mostapha Diss
author: Muhammad Mahajne
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2020-07-07T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: document
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 7218314
zbMATH Keywords: voting
zbMATH Keywords: multiwinner elections
zbMATH Keywords: committee
zbMATH Keywords: Condorcet
zbMATH Keywords: social acceptability
describes a project that uses: Convex
describes a project that uses: Normaliz
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2917485276
cites work: The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability
cites work: How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names
cites work: Computations of volumes and Ehrhart series in four candidates elections
cites work: Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
cites work: The \(q\)-majority efficiency of positional rules
cites work: Positional rules and \(q\)-Condorcet consistency
cites work: Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules
cites work: Q3282061
cites work: Sur un probl?me de g?om?trie diophantienne lin?aire. I. Poly?dres et r?seaux.
cites work: Properties of multiwinner voting rules
cites work: Condorcet winning sets
cites work: An Analysis of Simple Voting Systems for Electing Committees
cites work: Majority committees
cites work: The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
cites work: The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution
cites work: Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.
cites work: Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes
cites work: The Simple Majority Decision Rule
cites work: On stable rules for selecting committees
cites work: Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
cites work: On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
cites work: Level \(r\) consensus and stable social choice
cites work: The socially acceptable scoring rule
cites work: Condorcet winners and social acceptability
cites work: An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
cites work: Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
cites work: Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
cites work: Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
cites work: A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
cites work: The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
cites work: Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2020.03.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7218314