A noncooperative bargaining game with endogenous protocol and partial breakdown
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A noncooperative bargaining game with endogenous protocol and partial breakdown
zbMATH Open document ID: 1444.91012
author: Guangjing Yang
author: Hao Sun
author: Dongshuang Hou
author: Genjiu Xu
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2020-07-07T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A25
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 7218316
zbMATH Keywords: noncooperative bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: endogenous protocol
zbMATH Keywords: partial breakdown
zbMATH Keywords: core
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.mathsocsci.2020.04.003
OpenAlex ID: W3017714663
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DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2020.04.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7218316