A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model
zbMATH Open document ID: 1442.91031
author: Sarvesh Bandhu
author: Abhinaba Lahiri
author: Anup Pramanik
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2020-07-07T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B15
zbMATH DE Number: 7218460
zbMATH Keywords: binary social choice
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: positive welfare association
zbMATH Keywords: status quo rules
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2020.109154
OpenAlex ID: W3016727806
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DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109154
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7218460