On the approximability of simple mechanisms for MHR distributions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the approximability of simple mechanisms for MHR distributions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1435.91097
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_17
author: Yaonan Jin
author: Weian Li
author: Qi Qi
publication date: 2020-06-30T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B03
zbMATH DE Number: 7216345
zbMATH Keywords: approximation ratio
zbMATH Keywords: Myerson auction
zbMATH Keywords: anonymous pricing
zbMATH Keywords: second-price auction
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 978-3-030-35389-6 17
OpenAlex ID: W2991411207
cites work: Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing
cites work: Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing
cites work: A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
cites work: Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
cites work: The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
cites work: The sample complexity of auctions with side information
cites work: Revenue maximization with a single sample
cites work: Optimal pricing for MHR distributions
cites work: Comparisons of stop rule and supremum expectations of i.i.d. random variables
cites work: Making the Most of Your Samples
cites work: Tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing
cites work: Tight Revenue Gaps among Simple Mechanisms
cites work: Optimal Auction Design
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7216345