Buyer-optimal extensionproof information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Buyer-optimal extensionproof information
zbMATH Open document ID: 1447.91077
author: Stefan Terstiege
author: Cédric Wasser
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2020-08-07T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 7229439
zbMATH Keywords: information design
zbMATH Keywords: monopoly
zbMATH Keywords: regulation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2020.105070
OpenAlex ID: W2991218674
cites work: Information structures in optimal auctions
cites work: Sequential screening
cites work: Real Analysis and Probability
cites work: Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
cites work: Stress tests and information disclosure
cites work: Dynamic strategic information transmission
cites work: The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure
cites work: Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
cites work: Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
cites work: Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
cites work: Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
cites work: Inequalities: theory of majorization and its applications
cites work: Q3997321
cites work: An introduction to copulas.
cites work: Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning
cites work: Q4340161
cites work: Stochastic orders
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2020.105070
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7229439