Dynamic models for coordinating private and public interests in economic corruption
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Dynamic models for coordinating private and public interests in economic corruption
zbMATH Open document ID: 1448.91204
DOI: 10.1134/S1064230720010128
author: Anatoliĭ B. Usov
author: Gennadiĭ A. Ugol'nitskiĭ
published in: Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International
publication date: 2020-08-12T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B99
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A25
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
zbMATH DE Number: 7233444
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic game-theoretic models
zbMATH Keywords: private and public interest coordination
zbMATH Keywords: corruption
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s1064230720010128
OpenAlex ID: W3015116560
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7233444