Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule
zbMATH Open document ID: 0532.90009
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(83)90054-6
author: Taradas Bandyopadhyay
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1983-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 3845285
zbMATH Keywords: Coalitional manipulation
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto rule
zbMATH Keywords: aggregation procedures
zbMATH Keywords: choice sets
zbMATH Keywords: non-manipulability
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(83)90054-6
OpenAlex ID: W2073406568
cites work: Manipulation and the Pareto rule
cites work: Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
cites work: Q4196192
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3845285