Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach
zbMATH Open document ID: 0533.90022
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(84)90071-1
author: Joseph Greenberg
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1984-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: The author gives a scheme for reducing tax evasion to an arbitrarily small level within a given enforcement budget. There are three groups, \(G_ l\) a small group with reasonable probability of being audited, \(G_ 2\), a large group with small probability of being audited, and \(G_ 3\) a (theoretically empty) group who are always audited. Audited individuals found truthful are put in \(G_ 1\) (unless they are already in \(G_ 3)\) otherwise they go to \(G_ 3\) if in \(G_ 2\) and to \(G_ 2\) if in \(G_ 1\). A stationary Nash equilibrium occurs with any sufficiently small discount rate.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B60
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A24
zbMATH DE Number: 3847180
zbMATH Keywords: Markov chain
zbMATH Keywords: auditing scheme
zbMATH Keywords: tax avoidance
zbMATH Keywords: tax evasion
zbMATH Keywords: Audited individuals
zbMATH Keywords: stationary Nash equilibrium
reviewed by: Ki Hang Kim
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(84)90071-1
OpenAlex ID: W2072855188
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3847180