Solution for a class of repeated games without a recursive structure
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Solution for a class of repeated games without a recursive structure
zbMATH Open document ID: 0541.90101
DOI: 10.1007/BF01769882
author: Christine M. Waternaux
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 1983-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: There are two 2\(\times 2\) payoff matrices from which the referee choses with a probability P the true one before the game begins. Both players do not know this choice, but to every payoff matrix a matrix of signals matches so that at every stage of the game both players receive a signal corresponding to their strategic choices. The referee accumulates player 1's gains in the course of the game but does not inform the players of these gains. They can know the total sum only after the game is finished. A solution of the game is described.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A15
zbMATH DE Number: 3860916
zbMATH Keywords: infinitely repeated two-person zero-sum games
zbMATH Keywords: information matrices
zbMATH Keywords: two- person game
zbMATH Keywords: arbitration
zbMATH Keywords: chance move
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete information
reviewed by: Oleg Alekseivich Malafeev
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Q4076046
cites work: Repeated games with absorbing states
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cites work: The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on both sides
cites work: On a repeated game without a recursive structure
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cites work: On general minimax theorems
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3860916