Incentive compatibility and informational requirements
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Incentive compatibility and informational requirements
zbMATH Open document ID: 0542.90003
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(84)90160-1
author: Stefan Reichelstein
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1984-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 3862866
zbMATH Keywords: informational requirements
zbMATH Keywords: decentralized allocation procedures
zbMATH Keywords: incentive compatibility constraints
zbMATH Keywords: message space
zbMATH Keywords: dominant strategy
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(84)90160-1
OpenAlex ID: W2080061319
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3862866