Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge
zbMATH Open document ID: 0542.90021
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(84)90161-3
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1984-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B99
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B38
zbMATH DE Number: 3862884
zbMATH Keywords: incentive contracting
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto optimal contract
zbMATH Keywords: principal
zbMATH Keywords: risk-neutral agent
zbMATH Keywords: efficient outcome
author: David E. M. Sappington
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(84)90161-3
OpenAlex ID: W1966516819
cites work: Q4750370
cites work: Q5807222
cites work: Optimal Nonuniform Prices
cites work: Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
cites work: Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
cites work: Q4121644
cites work: A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
cites work: An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
cites work: Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3862884