Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
zbMATH Open document ID: 0549.90006
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(84)90152-2
author: Alvin E. Roth
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1984-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 3876861
zbMATH Keywords: two-sided discrete markets
zbMATH Keywords: marriage problem
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proof procedure for aggregating preferences
zbMATH Keywords: stable outcomes
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium misrepresentation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(84)90152-2
OpenAlex ID: W2161411850
cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
cites work: Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
cites work: The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
cites work: Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3876861