Independence of the status quo? A weak and a strong impossibility result for social decisions by bargaining
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Independence of the status quo? A weak and a strong impossibility result for social decisions by bargaining
zbMATH Open document ID: 0729.90002
DOI: 10.1007/BF01227017
author: Marlies Klemisch-Ahlert
published in: Journal of Economics
publication date: 1991-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: The author adresses the question of determining bargaining mechanisms for some set of decision problems which are independent of the status quo. The answer to this existence problem concludes with two impossibility theorems.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 4207164
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining mechanisms
zbMATH Keywords: status quo
zbMATH Keywords: impossibility theorems
reviewed by: Michel Le Breton
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Q3239655
cites work: Individual Monotonicity and Lexicographic Maxmin Solution
cites work: Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
cites work: The Nash Social Welfare Function
cites work: The Bargaining Problem
cites work: Two-Person Cooperative Games
cites work: Axiomatic bargaining theory on economic environments
cites work: Q5635232
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01227017
OpenAlex ID: W2046288082
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207164