Credible public policy
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Credible public policy
zbMATH Open document ID: 0729.90567
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1889(91)90036-Z
author: Nancy L. Stokey
publication date: 1991-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B62
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B84
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 62P20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B64
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 4207327
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
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full work available at URL: 0165-1889(91)90036-z
OpenAlex ID: W2044509448
published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207327