Can evolutionary dynamics explain free riding in experiments?
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Can evolutionary dynamics explain free riding in experiments?
zbMATH Open document ID: 0729.90627
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(91)90047-O
author: John H. Miller
author: James Andreoni
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 1991-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68T05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 92D15
zbMATH DE Number: 4207387
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207387