Common-value auctions with discrete private information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Common-value auctions with discrete private information
zbMATH Open document ID: 0732.90023
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(91)90133-O
author: Ruqu Wang
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1991-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 4211765
zbMATH Keywords: first-price, sealed-bid, common-value auction
zbMATH Keywords: finite-valued, conditionally independent private information
zbMATH Keywords: auction game
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Q5583599
cites work: Generalized Equilibrium Results for Games with Incomplete Information
cites work: The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
cites work: Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
cites work: Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
cites work: Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction
cites work: A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
cites work: Q3976515
cites work: A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
cites work: A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(91)90133-o
OpenAlex ID: W2056810902
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4211765