Independence of irrelevant interpersonal comparisons
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Independence of irrelevant interpersonal comparisons
zbMATH Open document ID: 0733.90004
DOI: 10.1007/BF00182445
author: Peter J. Hammond
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 1991-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: The author studies an aspect of the Arrow problem under the condition that the voters' ordering profile and, accordingly, the collective ordering are explicitly depending from a parameter belonging to some fixed set, which can be interpreted as reflecting ``ethics''. The case is studied when the parameter can change within the bounds of the fixed set. The Arrow condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives is reformulated for this case and this gives rise to a strengthened analogy of the Arrow theorem. In the last paragraphs it is assumed that the individual and the collective ordering is specified by an expected utility representation, which means the possibility of risk is accounted for. The connection between the obtained results and previous results obtained by \textit{A. Sen} and \textit{D. K. Osborne} [Econometrica 44, 1001- 1015 (1976; Zbl 0338.90010)] is investigated in detail.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 4213697
zbMATH Keywords: Arrow problem
zbMATH Keywords: independence of irrelevant alternatives
zbMATH Keywords: expected utility representation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00182445
OpenAlex ID: W2142761649
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4213697