On the theory of repeated games with private information. I: Anti-folk theorem without communication
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the theory of repeated games with private information. I: Anti-folk theorem without communication
zbMATH Open document ID: 0733.90086
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(91)90139-C
author: Hitoshi Matsushima
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 1991-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: We consider repeated games with private information and with discounting. We present an example in which the repetition of the one-shot equilibrium is the only reasonable pure strategy supergame equilibrium, where each player may almost perfectly monitor the other players' choices. This implies that if players' private signals are not correlated, it may be difficult to sustain collusion as an equilibrium.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 4213777
zbMATH Keywords: repeated games with private information
zbMATH Keywords: discounting
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
cites work: Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
cites work: An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
Wikidata QID: Q126297945
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4213777