Auction design with costly preference elicitation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Auction design with costly preference elicitation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1123.91318
author: David C. Parkes
published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
publication date: 2006-01-23T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
zbMATH DE Number: 5000689
zbMATH Keywords: computational mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: incremental revelation principle
zbMATH Keywords: meta-deliberation
zbMATH Keywords: proxy agents
zbMATH Keywords: preference elicitation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10472-005-4692-y
OpenAlex ID: W1970574540
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DOI: 10.1007/S10472-005-4692-Y
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5000689