Holdup and innovation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Holdup and innovation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1121.91376
author: Andrew Wait
published in: Journal of Economics
publication date: 2006-02-07T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B38
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 5004441
zbMATH Keywords: delay
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete contracts
zbMATH Keywords: holdup
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00712-005-0130-1
OpenAlex ID: W2092412926
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DOI: 10.1007/S00712-005-0130-1
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5004441